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The purpose of this study is to examine how the United
States Coast Guard develops and manages its law enforcement
mission. The author analyzes the Coast Guard's strategy
development in its maritime law enforcement mission.
Specifically, the thesis starts with a review of the strategy
concept and attempts to answer what strategy is, what a
strategist is, and what is strategic planning. Secondly,
this study cites four factors (the organizational culture,
public opinion, the law enforcement mission role, and
expectations) that will significantly influence Coast Guard
law enforcement strategy in the 1990s. Finally, the author
addresses the current Coast Guard law enforcement strategy
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Throughout the history of the United States, the U.S.
Coast Guard has served as the leading agency in maritime
interdiction. This role appears to be gaining increased
importance as the nation enters the 1990s. In the 1980s the
United States' drug abuse problem became increasingly
significant to the point where President Reagan declared the
problem a national security issue. New developments, such as
increased Department of Defense involvement in narcotics
interdiction, and a heightened national interest on the
nation's drug problem, focus the need for effective Coast
Guard strategic management in its law enforcement mission.
B. THE COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT MISSION
Today's Coast Guard missions may be divided into seven
major program areas: Enforcement of Laws and Treaties (ELT),
Search and Rescue (SAR), Aids to Navigation (ATON), Ice
Operations, Marine Environmental Protection, Marine Safety,
and Defense Readiness. Thus, the Coast Guard's Enforcement
of Laws and Treaties (law enforcement) mission is one of
seven major programs for which the service is responsible.
The Coast Guard carries out its role of maritime drug
interdiction under the authority of its ELT program.
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The overall objective of the Enforcement of Laws and
Treaties program is to enforce aU federal laws in the marine
environment, except those specifically assigned to other
Coast Guard programs, such as vessel safety and marine
pollution. This multidimensional law enforcement program
includes the following program objectives:
1. Enforce federal law on the high seas and in U.S.
waters.
2. Interdict drug smugglers and illegal migrants.
3. Enforce Exclusive Economic Zone laws and regulations up
to 200 nautical miles off U.S. shores.
4. Inspect domestic and foreign fishing vessels to ensure
compliance with U.S. laws.
5. Help other agencies enforce U.S. laws.
C. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
This thesis examines the development of the Coast Guard's
law enforcement strategy for the 1990s. Although the Coast
Guard maritime law enforcement mission includes other areas
of emphasis, the scope of the study will focus primarily on
narcotics interdiction.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
There is no formally stated long-range Coast Guard law
enforcement strategy to date. This study primarily asks
"What is the Coast Guard's law enforcement strategy and how
is that strategy developed?"
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To get to the heart of the Coast Guard's law enforcement
strategy, several other subsidiary questions arise and are
addressed in this study. These questions include:
1. What are the weaknesses, opportunities, threats, and
strengths underlying strategic management of the USCG
law enforcement mission?
2. How is the illegal drug enforcement strategy affected
by increased national interest in:
a. halting the flow of narcotics into the U.S. versus
eradication in the producing nations?
b. diverting resources from supply reduction toward
reducing demand?
3. How is USCG strategic management in the law enforcement
mission affected by increased Department of Defense
involvement in narcotics interdiction?
4. What effect does increased Department of Defense
involvement in narcotics interdiction have on USCG
tactics, resources, and force structure?
5. How does the USCG budget structure reflect its law
enforcement strategy?
6. How does the federal budget process (deficit reduction,
Congressional oversight, etc.) influence USCG law
enforcement strategy?
E. THESIS METHODOLOGY
This study combines a theoretical examination of the
strategy concept with the practical application of strategic
planning in the Coast Guard law enforcement mission. To do
so, the author conducted research that focused on
professional readings from both military and civilian
strategic management publications as points of contrast and
comparison. The practical aspect of Coast Guard law
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enforcement strategy and its development emerged as a result
of extensive periodical readings and personal or telephone
interviews with key Coast Guard and Department of Defense
personnel in strategic, planning, programming, budgeting, and
operating law enforcement roles.
The purpose in starting with a theoretical approach to
answering the Coast Guard law enforcement strategy question
is to develop a sound understanding of a concept that is
inherently ambiguous. Tc this end, the author looks at the
strategy concept from three perspectives. First, reviewing
"What is strategy?" develops some common themes to the varied
definitions of strategy. Second, identifying "What is a
strategist?" serves to highlight intuition and rationality as
desirable traits in the person who strategizes. Third,
introducing "What is strategic planning?" exhibits the
dynamic nature of the strategy process.
The theoretical and practical strategy issues are linked
by focusing on four factors that will significantly influence
Coast Guard law enforcement strategy in the 1990s.
Specifically, these factors are the Coast Guard's
organizational culture, public opinion, the Coast Guard's
role in maritime law enforcement, and maritime law
enforcement expectations. Each of the factors contributes to
the steps in the strategic planning process that directly
assist in identifying strategic Coast Guard law enforcement
issues. The particular steps of the process are identifying
4
organizational mandates, assessing the external and internal
environments, and clarifying organizational missions and
values.
Finally, the author examines the practical development
and implementation of Coast Guard law enforcement strategy.
The National Drug Control Strategy and the Department of
Transportation's Strategies for Action provide "top-down"
strategy direction. The Coast Guard "bottom-up" strategy
includes the objectives, policies, and action sequences that
are embodied in the service's planning, programming,
budgeting, and evaluation system.
In concluding, the author relates his practical findings
to the theoretical strategic planning process. The author
answers the primary research question by summarizing the
Coast Guard law enforcement strategy and leading the reader
through the strategic planning process which results in
development of that strategy. The research questions are
then reiterated and their answers summarized. Finally, the
author closes by recommending that a formal, long-range
strategy statement should be issued by the Coast Guard.
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II. THE STRATEGY CONCEPT
This section introduces the strategy concept from three
separate, yet related, approaches. We begin the process by
asking the question, "What is strategy?" Once the recurring
theme in the strategy definitions has been determined, the
next issue determines "What is a strategist?" We shall
determine that the strategist can be visualized as embodying
the characteristics of both a leader and a manager. Finally,
the strategic planning process is explained by answering
"What is strategic planning?" In this focus, strategic
planning is described and contrasted with long-range
planning. The author then offers Bryson's description of a
strategic planning process to model Coast Guard law
enforcement strategic management.
A. WHAT IS STRATEGY?
There is no single, universally-accepted definition of
strategy. Different concepts of strategy can be combined to
form a definition that is unique to a given situation.
However, the recurring theme in each strategy definition
examined in this research is that strategy is an ongoing,
never ending process that is dominated by a sense of purpose
regarding the future of an individual or organization.
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In his article entitled "So What is Strategy?" Roger
Evered examines the three strategy concepts of Andrews
(corporate strategy), Liddell-Hart (military strategy), and
Michael (futures research strategy). Each of their
conceptions of strategy pertains to one of three key aspects
of Coast Guard law enforcement (fiscal competition for
limited resources, physical interdiction of smuggling
activities, and resource allocation among the Coast Guard's
multiple missions).
First, Coast Guard strategy in the highly competitive
fiscal arena of law enforcement (Evered's corporate strategy
field)
...is seen as a process for generating viable directions
that lead to satisfactory performance in the market place,
given a variety of legal constraints and the existence of
competitors. Strategy is characterized as rivalry amongst
peers, for prizes in a defined and shared game. [Ref. l:p.
70]
Second, the service's law enforcement strategy in the
area of interdiction (Evered's military strategy field)
...is viewed as the art of winning a protracted struggle
against adversaries. Strategy here is seen as an enduring
struggle between enemies. Power and control of the other's
behavior is the prize. [Ref. l:p. 70]
Dhird, Coast Guard strategy regarding the allocation of
its multimission resources toward the law enforcement mission
(Evered's futures research strategy field) "is viewed as a
joint task of appreciating a complex of environmental changes
and making core existential choices in situations of massive
change." [Ref. 1:p. 70]
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Overall, the most powerful description of strategy the
author discovered was that articulated by Andrews. He
describes strategy as
...the pattern of decisions in a company that determines
and reveals its objectives, purposes, or goals, produces
the principal policies and plans for achieving those goals,
and defines the range of business the company is to pursue,
the kind of economic and human organization it is or
intends to be, and the nature of the economic and non-
economic contribution it intends to make to its
shareholders, employees, customers and communities. [Ref.
2:p. 43]
B. WHAT IS A STRATEGIST?
There is a difference between leadership and management,
but both concepts contribute to the notion of what a
strategist is. Leadership can form and affect culture.
Schein writes, "A unique function of 'leadership' as
contrasted with 'management' or 'administration,' is the
creation and management of culture." [Ref. 3:p. 171]
Leadership is intuitive, management is rational. The concept
of leadership follows from Burns' description of a
transformational leader--one who engages with others in such
a way that he and his followers raise one another to higher
levels of motivation and morality [Ref. 4:pp. 19-20].
Management relates to Burns' description of a
transactional leader--one who takes the initiative in making
contact with others for the purpose of an exchange of valued
things. Mintzberg describes four roles, or organized sets of
behavior that make up a manager's job, as seen in Table 1.
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Interestingly, Mintzberg cites the function of "leader"
within the interpersonal role of the manager. Nonetheless,
each of these roles contributes to a manager's capability to
strategize [Ref. 5:p. 27].
TABLE 1
THE MANAGER'S ROLES














A strategist combines the features of both the
transformational leader and the transactional leader.
Forming and executing strategy requires the intuition of
leadership and the rationality of management. The
strategist, as leader and manager, then forms the patterns of
decisions that integrate an organization's goals, policies,
and action sequences [Ref. 6:p. 8).
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C. WHAT IS STRATEGIC PLANNING?
Steiner defines formal strategic planning from four
points of view:
1. Strategic planning deals with the futurity of current
decisions and analyzes the cause and effect
consequences over time of an actual or intended
decision that a manager is going to make.
2. Strategic planning is a continuing process that begins
with the setting of organizational aims, defines
strategies and policies to achieve them, and develops
detailed plans to ensure that the strategies are
implemented to achieve the ends sought.
3. Strategic planning is a philosophy, a thought process,
an intellectual exercise, rather than a prescribed set
of processes, procedures, structures, or techniques.
4. A formal strategic planning system is a structure that
links three major types of plans: strategic plans,
medium-range plans, and short-range budgets and
operating plans. [Ref. 7:pp. 13-15]
Strategic planning is a management innovation that is
likely to persist because, unlike many other recent
innovations, it accepts and builds on the nature of political
decision making. The strategic planning process can be
applied at each level of the Coast Guard's law enforcement
chain of command. Each leader and manager needs to exercise
as much judgment as possible in the areas under their
control. To do so, the Coast Guard leader and manager must
develop effective strategies to cope with changed and
changing circumstances, and must form a consistent and
justifiable basis for decision making. Thus, strategic
planning is a set of concepts, procedures, and tools designed
10
to assist leaders and managers with the aforementioned tasks
[Ref. 8:p. xii).
1. Strategic Planning versus Lona-Ranae Plannina
Strategic planning and long-range planning are often
used synonymously. While there may be little difference in
outcome, Bryson notes that they usually differ in four
fundamental ways, as seen in Table 2. [Ref. 8:pp. 7-8]
There is no such thing as the strategic planning
process which every organization should accept. Strategic
planning processes must be designed to fit the unique
characteristics of each organization. Planning is not a
panacea for the problem of strategy making [Ref. 9:p. 88].
The focus of strategic planning is not the process itself,
rather, strategic planning must be a set of concepts that
assist leaders to make important decisions and take important
actions. If the strategic planning process hinders strategic
thinking and acting, scrap the process, not the thinking and
acting [Ref. 8:p. 2]. As Steiner notes, strategic planning
is not an effort to replace management intuition and judgment
[Ref. 7:p. 16).
2. The Strategic Planning Process
Since strategy can be regarded as a Drocess, it is
important to determine how strategy is d l]e. The author
chose Bryson's strategic planning process to model Coast
Guard law enforcement strategic management because it best
represents the key features of an organization operating in
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TABLE 2
STRATEGIC VERSUS LONG RANGE PLANNING
Strategic Plannina Lona Ranxe Planning
1. FOCUS
- identifies/resolves issues - specifies goals and
- does not presume consensus objectives




- greater emphasis on asses- - assumes current trends
sing external and internal will continue into
environment the future
- expects new trends end - less likely to include
discontinuities qualitative shifts in
- includes broader range of direction
contingency plans
3. VISION
- conjures an idealized ver- - forecasts linear ex-
sion of the organization trspolation of the
- includes "vision of success" present





- more action oriented - assumes a most likely
- considers a range of future
possible futures - works backward to map
- focuses on implications out decisions/actions
of present decisions/ necessary to reach
actions assumed future
- considers multiple - tends to lock into a
decision streams single stream of
decisions/actions
the public sector. Bryson's strategic planning process
includes three notable approaches that particularly apply to
the overall characteristics of the Coast Guard and its
environment. These approaches, namely, the Harvard Policy
model (Andrews, 1980; Christensen et al., 1983), the
Stakeholder Management approach (Freeman, 1984), and the
Logical Incrementalism approach (Quinn, 1980; Lindblom,
1959), and their key features, assumptions, strengths, and
weaknesses are presented in Table 3. [Ref. 8:pp. 24-28)
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TABLE 3
APPROACHES TO STRATEGIC PLANNING
Harvard Policy Model
Ke leaturee: Primer ly applicable at the strategic business unit level. WOTS Analysis. Analysis
of memageont's values and social obligations of the firm. Attempts to develop the best "fit"
between a firm and its enviromment; i.e.. best strategy for the firm.
eenptems: Analysis of WOTSs, management values, and social obligations of firm will facilitate
identification of the best strategy. Agreement is possible within the top management team
respmasble for strategy formulation and implementation. Teem has the ability to implement its
decisions. Implementation of the best strategy will result in improved firm performance.
3taeha: Systematic assessment of strengths and weaknesses of firm and opportunities and threats
facing firm. Attention to management values and social obligations of the firm. Systematic
attention to the "fit" between the firm and its environment. Can be used in conjunction with other
approaches.
Iekmeeee: Does not offer specific advice on how to develop strategies. Fails to consider many
existing or potential stakeholder groups.
Stakeholder manaaement Approach
Key eatures: Identification of key stakeholders and the criteria they use to judge an
organization's performance. Development of strategies to deal with each stakeholder.
*maaqptios: An organization's survival and prosperity depend on the extent to which it satisfies
its key stakeholders. An organization's strategy will be successful only if it meets the needs of
key stakeholders.
3trmgtha: Recognition that many claims, both complementary and competing, are placed on an
organization. Stakeholder analysis (i.e.. a listing of key stakeholders an of the criteria they use
to judge an organization's performance.) Can be used in conjunction with other approaches.
Weaneses: Absence of criteria with which to judge different claims. Need for more advice on how
to develop strategies to deal with divergent stakeholder claims.
Loaical Incrementalism Approach
Key Features: Emphasizes the importance of small changes as part of developing and implementing
organizational strategies. Fuses strategy formulation and implementation.
Asmtiions: Strategy is a loosely linked group of decisions that are handled incrementally.
Decentralised decision making is both politically expedient and necessary. Small, decentralized
decisions can help identify end fulfill organizational purposes.
Stragths: Ability to handle complexity and change. Attention to both formal and informal
processes. Political realism. Emphasis on both minor and major decisions. Can be used in
conjunction with other approaches.
Weakwesses: No guarantee that the loosely linked, incremental decisions will add up to fulfillment
of overall organizational purposes.
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The following strategic planning process suggested by
Bryson attempts to help key decision makers think and act
strategically. The process includes setting broad policy
directions, assessing the internal and external environments,
attending key stakeholders, identifying key issues,
developing strategies to deal with each issue, making
decisions, acting, and continually monitoring results.
Bryson's strategic planning process consists of eight steps,
as follows:
1. Initiating and agreeing on a strategic planning
process.
2. Identifying organizational mandates.
3. Clarifying organizational missions and values.
4. Assessing the external environment: opportunities and
threats.
5. Assessing the internal environment: strengths and
weaknesses.
6. Identifying the strategy issues facing an organization.
7. Formulating strategies to manage the issues.
8. Establishing an effective organizational vision for the
future--the "vision of success."
The interactions of the strategic planning process
are diagrammed in Figure 1. Bryson's strategic planning
process is introduced here to emphasize that strategic
planning is a dynamic process that involves many different









- - - - - - - - - -
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Bryson's process closely matches the Coast Guard's
approach to strategy development. Bryson's strategic
planning process and its relation to Coast Guard law
enforcement strategic planning will be summarized in the
concluding chapter.
Before doing so, however, the succeeding chapter
focuses on connecting the strategy concept to Coast Guard law
enforcement strategy. This will be accomplished by focusing
on how the external and internal environments affect the
Coast Guard's law enforcement strategy.
16
III. FACTORS SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTING COAST GUARD
LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY
It is not the author's intention to identify every factor
that affects Coast Guard law enforcement strategy. However,
the purpose of identifying culture, public opinion, the Coast
Guard law enforcement role, and expectations is to highlight
their significant effect on the Coast Guard's internal and
external environments and the resulting development of the
service's law enforcement strategy in the 1990s.
A. THE COAST GUARD'S ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
Studying the Coast Guard's culture will show how the
organization solved its basic problems of surviving in and
adapting to the external environment, and how it integrates
its internal processes to ensure the capacity to continue to
survive and adapt. [Ref. 3:p. 50]
1. An Overview
The Coast Guard's organizational culture is closely
linked to its small size in relation to the other armed
services. Until recently, the nation's oldest seagoing
service has maintained a low profile in the media, the
political arena, and the community. Occasionally, a major
event will occur that showcases the Coast Guard--Caribbean
narcotics and immigrant interdiction operations, the Coast
Guard base on Governors Island, New York, hosting the Liberty
17
Week 1986 festivities and the Presidential summit meeting in
1988, or the Valdez, Alaska tanker oil spill--but, for the
most part, the service has lacked the prestige in society
commensurate with the jobs it performs.
Schein writes that, "Individual and organizational
performance, and the feelings that people in an organization
have about that organization, cannot be understood unless one
takes into account the organization's culture." [Ref. 3:p.
24] To understand the Coast Guard and its people, we must
analyze its organizational culture.
2. The FoundinQ Father
The Coast Guard's roots date back to the
establishment of the United States Revenue Cutter Service,
which was initiated by Congress on August 4, 1790. The
Service was to act as the maritime strong arm of Treasury
Secretary Alexander Hamilton as he attempted to enforce
American tariffs. Working on an extremely tight budget,
Hamilton had ten new cutters constructed, and thus the Coast
Guard as we know it today got underway. [Ref. 10:pp. 32-34]
Hamilton's plan was to keep a solitary cutter
stationed near each of the nation's major ports from Maine to
Georgia. This spread the assets of the Revenue Cutter
Service along the eastern seaboard much in the same way that
the Coast Guard's assets are now found in small coastal
inlets as well as in the major ports. Just as Hamilton
wanted the Revenue Cutter Service to cover as much of the
18
coast as possible, the same concern holds for the Coast Guard
today.
This illustrates three examples of how the individual
intentions of the founder of a new organization, his
definition of the situation, his assumptions and values,
"come to be a shared, consensually validated set of
definitions that are passed on to new members as 'the correct
way to define a situation."' [Ref. 3:p. 50) The Revenue
Cutter Service operated on a tight budget, had a large area
to cover, and had to perform a difficult task with limited
assets. The notions of "Small Service, Big Job," and "Doing
More With Less,"' are undercurrents of the attitudes that
exist in the Coast Guard today.
The Coast Guard's cultural formation process started
with its founder, Alexander Hamilton, who had, as Schein
states, "a major impact on how the group defines and solves
its external adaptation and internal integration problems."
[Ref. 3:p. 210] The Coast Guard exists as a result of an
evolutionary process. As the years passed following the
establishment of the Revenue Cutter Service, other
organizations, such as the Lifesaving Service (1912) and the
Lighthouse Service (1939) were combined with the Revenue
Cutter Service to form the modern Coast Guard. Other duties
were also added to the Coast Guard's missions, such as
'Actual USCG bumper sticker slogans.
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international ice patrol after the 1912 sinking of the
Titanic. The service was also charged with enforcing
whatever maritime interdiction that the government required.
For example, the Coast Guard was tasked with halting the
maritime flow of contraband during the Prohibition period,
just as today it patrols our coasts to prevent narcotics
smuggling.
The Coast Guard has expanded and contracted its size
to meet wartime obligations, however, its resources
(personnel, platforms, operating expenses) were seldom
increased to match each additional mis3ion it assumed. There
lies the fundamental highlight of the organizational culture,
the Coast Guard motto, Semper Paratus. The Coast Guard's
philosophy is that it's "always ready" to take on a mission.
However, the service itself is continually forced to do more
with less.
Now that the culture has matured through the long and
rich Coast Guard history, the culture creates the
perceptions, thoughts, and feelings of every new generation
in the organization. This makes the organization predisposed
to certain kinds of leadership. [Ref. 3:p. 313]
3. The Coast Guard's Cultural Leader
The organizational culture has developed a Coast
Guard leader who is a "go-getter," who can do "more with
less." What the culture hasn't fostered is someone who is
proactive rather than reactive, who is exciting rather than
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excitable. The service's culture has lead to a "firehouse
mentality" that waits for something to happen--like awaiting
the Search and Rescue alarm to sound--before springing into
action. These characteristics of a Coast Guard leader also
result from the process--also part of the culture--where the
service is directed to do a job (such as stopping the massive
inflow of Cuban refugees in the early 1980s), so it goes out
and does it with whatever resources are available.
The Coast Guard's culture affects its policy and the
image the service projects. There is no "once and for all"
policy, and this is the result of short-term reactions to the
political setting [Ref. 11, p. 272]. As always, the Coast
Guard gets the job done, but its methods are sometimes
subject to question. For example, the reactive part of Coast
Guard culture--cutting out non-emergency Search and Rescue to
cut costs--served to undermine the traditional aspect of
Coast Guard culture--assisting vessels in distress.
4. The Coast Guard's Changing Culture
To specify the function culture serves, we must list,
from an evolutionary perspective, the issues that an
organization faces from its origin through to its state of
maturity and decline. Now it seems that the organizational
culture which has developed while the Coast Guard matured may
be changing. Until the 1980s, the Coast Guard's basic
problem was limited funding. The Coast Guard's reaction to
21
this problem was to "grin and bear it," and still accomplish
its missions.
In 1989, Coast Guard Commandant Paul Yost stated
that, "I can't run ships without fuel, and I'm not going to
run units I can't afford to maintain." (Ref. 12:p. 22] Non-
emergency Search and Rescue is handled by commercial towing,
and aids to navigation maintenance is being contracted in
lieu of acquiring the assets to do so. The Congress is
slowly realizing that maritime interdiction is not cost
effective in reducing the nation's drug problems [Ref. 13],
therefore, the budgetary relief the Coast Guard receives to
augment its forces to combat smuggling may be in jeopardy.
The Coast Guard has stretched itself as thinly as it can, no
longer will it continue to do "more with less." It's obvious
that the culture of yesterday won't solve the problems faced
today. Thus, the culture is under stress and may have to
change. Just as Alexander Hamilton directed the formation of
the Coast Guard's culture when the Revenue Cutter Service was
founded, Coast Guard strategy makers are challenged with
incorporating the changes that are taking place in the Coast
Guard's culture today. Coast Guard strategy must mesh with
what the Coast Guard has to offer in fulfilling the national
interest.
5. Changing Culture Affects Strategv
Bryson links the concepts of philosophy, culture, and
image in a "service hexagon" as a way of determining what
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service strategies an organization should pursue, as seen in
Figure 2. The service hexagon centers on the notion that for
a product or service to be effective (to pass a "market
test"), six elements must be linked: who wants the product
or service (the target market), what they want (the specific
product or service), where they want it (location), when they
want it (delivery timing), h they want it (delivery method,
technologies used), and why they want it (fulfilled func-
tions, purposes served, reasons for use).
wh who
How PnspyWa
Figure 2. The Service Hexagon
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When one of the internal characteristics of an
organization changes, a strategy change can be anticipated
(Ref. 8:p. 264]. To illustrate Bryson's service hexagon,
consider that the Coast Guard's Semper Paratus philosophy
remains intact. Now assume that, as previously discussed,
the service's culture is changing. This cultural change also
affects the Coast Guard's image. As the service displays
more emphasis toward its law enforcement mission, the Coast
Guard image of "the Lifesavers" changes to that of the
"Smokeys of the Sea." Instead of just one characteristic
changing, the service is experiencing a dual change. The
changing culture and image leads to strategy changes as the
Coast Guard addresses the issue of providing law enforcement
"service." The final outcome results when all these changes
combine to affect the law enforcement mission strategy.
As long as it has the power to do the job, which the
author equates with adequate resources, the Coast Guard will
continue to survive. Increased competition for fiscal
resources will force the Coast Guard to market itself in the
political arena and in the public sector. The changing Coast
Guard culture, specifically regarding obtaining adequate
resources to accomplish a mission, creates a need to change
the service's fiscal strategy. Thus, as Bryson would suggest
using his service hexagon, a change in the Coast Guard
culture brings about a change in its strategy. The changed
strategy is evidenced by Commandant Yost's increased emphasis
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on--and success in--selling or marketing the service's
capabilities to Congress [Ref. 14:pp. 10-11).
The Coast Guard's role in serving the national
interest will expand as long as it receives enough resources
to perform its missions. The service has an abundance of
exceptional performance to focus on as proof that it serves
the nation, and that it's in the nation's interest to have a
strong Coast Guard.
B. PUBLIC OPINION
This section focuses on the impact of public opinion on
the development of strategy. Public opinion affects Coast
Guard law enforcement strategy development through its heavy
influence on policy.
Strategy development is closely linked to an organiza-
tion's capacity to attain goals. This goal-achieving ability
is inherently tied to the organization's resource base. In
times when competition for scarce fiscal resources is
especially intense, Congress tends to respond to the demands
of its constituents, and the Administration remains closely
tuned to public concerns. Thus, the Coast Guard must
consider the impact of public opinion when it develops its
law enforcement strategy.
1. An overview
General Social Surveys were first generated by the
General Opinion Research Center in the 1930s; each year since
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then measures of public opinion have become increasingly
significant to policy makers. Public opinion affects
strategy through its effects on an organization's goals and,
particularly, policies. The most recognizable measure of
public opinion is the opinion poll, which attempts to gain
insight about public sentiment from a representative sample
of the population being measured. As Philip Converse notes,
"Public opinion is what the polls try to measure, or what
they measure with modest error." (Ref. 15:p. S14]
2. The Variability of Public Opinion
The most striking characteristic of public opinion
over the years is its variability over time. There are
distinct trends in the opinion of the public as a whole which
reflect the public's narrow focus and immediate reactions to
emerging situations. [Ref. 16:p. 62]
The variability of public opinion is principally a
function of six factors:
1. Individual personality characteristics.
2. Ideology, an individual's way of viewing the world.
3. Past generational experience.
4. An individual's acceptance of authority, willingness to
follow leaders and social conventions.
5. Economic self-interests.
6. Alternative choices. [Ref. 17:p. 83]
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3. Types of Public Opinion
Fundamentally important before analyzing, evaluating,
or acting on a response to public opinion is that a policy
maker consider how important an issue is to an individual in
relation to other issues [Ref. 18:p. 75]. Sometimes a
divergence occurs between "populist" public opinion as
measured by surveys, and the "atmospheric" public opinion
that is the actual public opinion effective in the political
arena [Ref. 15:p. 19]. An example of the difference between
populist and atmospheric public opinion measures can be found
in the gun control issue. The populist opinion measured by
pollsters is that most Americans favor gun control. However,
no steps are effectively taken by the public toward
influencing political leaders to enact gun control, thus
atmospheric public opinion appears to be indifferent toward
the gun control issue.
If populist public opinion doesn't always result in
action, what conditions affect the impact of public opinion
on policy? As stated, Americans respond to perceptions of
world events. Public opinion toward policies of the American
government can be described as "permissive" in that a wide
range of government activity is acceptable to the public.
This contrasts with "directive" opinions, which specify that
certain alternatives are definitely demanded or opposed [Ref.
19:p. 98]. For example, individual thoughts concerning drug
control spending are characterized as permissive opinion
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because various actions (interdiction, treatment, education)
are supported by the public. A person's view on the abortion
issue can be considered as a directive opinion since the
decision to legalize abortion is generally classified as
either yes or no.
4. Influencing Public Opinion
Studies have shown that public opinion is signifi-
cantly affected by highly publicized crises (such as the
Americans held hostage in Iran or the current national drug
abuse crisis), and the public's level of understanding the
issue (usually characterized as low) [Ref. 16:p. 71]. Three
fundamental groups with vested interests in policy making
actively influence public opinion. First, media coverage of
incidents tend to bring crises into the American living room.
The particular increase in television documentation that
tends to gear toward sensational issues places public opinion
at the mercy of graphic displays of events as they occur.
Second, rhetoric from our political leadership takes the form
of carefully packaged issues with simple, attractive slogans
meant to persuade the public toward accepting political
actions proposed by the government. Third, interest groups
actively campaign toward influencing both public opinion and
the way that governmental policy reflects the perceived
national interest.
Significant groups can be persuaded for short periods
of time in response to an issue before opinion reverts to the
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status quo. It's during these short bursts of activity
surrounding an event or crisis that policy makers are
affected by the pressures of public opinion and interest
groups. For example, a symbiotic relationship between
interest groups and Congress has developed to use and
influence public opinion. Congress finds the information
provided by interest groups, and the penchant of interest
groups to sort out issues and set priorities for the
Congressional agenda, forceful in overcoming legislative
inertia. Members of Congress look to interest groups for
valuable constituency, technical, or political information,
for reelection support, and for strategic assistance in
passing or blocking selected legislation. Interest groups,
on the other hand, rely on Congress as an institution where
their representative position of public opinion can be heard
in an attempt to achieve policy goals. [Ref. 20:p. 224]
The key concept is the transfer of information.
Public opinion is formed by the perceptions generated in the
information transfer process. Biases are introduced into the
information flow. The media, policy makers, and interest
groups influence the public through the manner in which their
information is conveyed and interpreted. Distortions are
created by manipulation; data can be used to create false
images, and that leads to a badly informed public. James L.
Payne highlights the exaggerations and distortions about
defense spending put forth by critics of the defense
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establishment and the nation's defense policy. Specifically,
on the policy issue of American military preparedness, the
facts presented to the American public are often misreported
in "astounding dimensions." [Ref. 21:p. 61]
Forming a policy, budgeting for that policy, and then
executing the policy involves a dynamic process with several
principal players or factors. Each of the players is
affected by the actions of other players in the process. In
the arena of national drug control, our nation's political
leaders, the policy makers, must persuade or convince the
other players of the need for continued drug control spending
to attain our highest political aim: to make drugs undesir-
able and hard to get through a mix of supply and demand
policies [Ref. 22:p. 43].
5. Perceptions Affect Public Oinion
The public's perception of the world affects their
opinion on America's national drug control policy. Public
perception often centers on the balance of strength between
the United States and its adversaries. Public opinion
concerning the world balance of military power was evidenced
in the presidential elections of 1960, when a perceived
missile gap tied to the Eisenhower administration weighed
against Vice President Nixon, and again in 1980 when a sense
of weak national security policy damaged the campaign
rhetoric of incumbent President Carter (Ref. 23:p. 155] Both
the Kennedy and Reagan administrations subsequently sparked a
30
resurgence of confidence in American military power and its
weaponry. Mandates for increased policy emphasis on defense
are represented in the 1980 public opinion shift toward
greater willingness to spend on defense than on any other
kind of spending [Ref. 24:p. 385). Three trends are cited in
the public's support of President Reagan's execution of an
increased national security and defense posture: 1) the
decline in impact of the Viet Nam war; 2) a rise in elements
of conservative ideology; and 3) an increase in anti-Soviet
and anticommunist sentiment [Ref. 21:p. 103).
Currently, the significant reduction in the perceived
fear of a communist threat has caused policy makers to
reevaluate their strategies and reformulate policies
regarding national security and defense. Resources
previously allocated toward countering the communist threat
now may be available to focus on the drug control issue.
Thus, public opinion sends signals to policy makers
concerning what policy should be formulated. The level of
commitment toward a policy is reflected in public approval of
budgeted spending levels, and the final evaluation of policy
execution often comes on election day.
6. Public Opinion's Affect on Policy
What of the relationship between public opinion
measures and policy formulation and execution? Does public
opinion change cause policy change, or vice versa? The
importance of public opinion to policy makers is evident when
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you consider the new vocation of campaign consultant which
has emerged in the last three decades with roots in the
special expertise of how to conduct public opinion polls and
how to read their results. The significance of a public
opinion analyst reached its apogee during the Reagan
administration when daily White House opinion polls were
conducted. Policy makers often pay large sums of money for
public opinion polling information, often not to change
policy, but to know what issues to avoid and which to
emphasize. [Ref. 15:pp. 17-22]
Analysis of the relationship between public opinion
and policy making in the last 50 years by Page and Shapiro
shows a great deal of congruence between changes in policy
and changes in public opinion. While none of the
quantitative studies measuring the degree of congruence
between popular opinion and policy outcomes of the political
process show perfect congruence, most show a considerable
degree of it [Ref. 25:pp. 177-189]. Specifically, large
congruence is noted when opinion changes are large and
sustained and issues are salient. Congruence, however, does
not indicate causality. Page and Shapiro argue that public
opinion is a real influence--often an intervening one--on
policy making in more than half of the cases of congruent
change, while they are unsure how often policy change causes
congruence between opinion and policy. Thus, opinion changes
are an important cause of policy change. When a third factor
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affects both opinion and policy, it tends to affect policy
through opinion; policy changes because opinion changes [Ref.
25:p. 177-189].
Budgeting is affected by public opinion because it is
inherently linked to policy. As Wildavsky states, "budgeting
is concerned with translating financial resources into human
purposes," and a budget is "a link between financial
resources and human behavior in order to accomplish policy
objectives...a series of goals with price tags attached."
(Ref. 26:p. 2] Thus, budgeting lies at the center of the
political process, and budgets are affected by public opinion
through opinion's influence on policy making.
For example, the American public has been of two
minds regarding the United States' national security and
defense policy; it demands leadership that vigorously pursues
arms control and reduction, and it also wants a policy that
provides for a strong defense [Ref. 23:p. 150]. This duality
stimulates flexible policy and budgeting choices. As long as
no defense weakness is perceived, arms reduction is
acceptable. Likewise, the American public will not accept
being held at a military disadvantage. President Reagan and
Defense Secretary Weinberger took advantage of permissive
public opinion when they continued to favor larger defense
budgets in the mid-1980s despite lacking the full support of
the American public [Ref. 27:p. 44].
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7. Public Opinion and Drug Control Policy
What can be concluded about the relationship between
public opinion and national drug control policy? First,
public opinion and policy are closely related when
considering congruent changes over time. Second, public
opinion is one of several factors that influence policy
making. The policy making process evidences a dynamic
interaction of many players (policy makers, the public,
interest groups, the media) and factors (current events, past
history, future expectations). Third, public opinion is
affected by the perceptions of individuals, and can be
significantly affected by highly publicized crises on salient
issues for short periods of time before returning to the
status quo. Finally, information plays a key role in
developing individual perceptions. Information is often
provided to the public by players with policy issues needing
public support. Thus, information is sometimes tainted, or
deceptive, and biased toward swinging public opinion toward a
particular issue.
Policy changes taking place today in the areas of
drug control, national security, and defense spending can be
seen to result from significant swings in public opinion.
The public no longer perceives a threat from the communist
world and battle lines are being drawn by policy makers on
whether to alter the course of the nation's defense based
upon short-term public perceptions. The threat to national
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security from illegal drugs remains. However, the method of
countering this threat combines a mixture of supply and
demand reduction policies. There is a good deal of
flexibility in these permissive areas of public opinion.
Therefore, it appears that drastic policy changes in drug
control strategy will not necessarily result from the current
state of affairs.
C. THE COAST GUARD'S ROLE IN MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT
The Coast Guard's role in maritime law enforcement is a
perception that significantly affects the service's strategy
development. As long as the United States has had a need for
maritime law enforcement, it has had a need for the Coast
Guard.
1. An Overview
The Coast Guard perceives its role in the law
enforcement mission as that of the nation's leading maritime
interdiction agency. The Coast Guard develops its law
enforcement strategy to incorporate two concepts. First, the
service's image as the "Smokeys of the Sea" affects the Coast
Guard law enforcement strategy, as shown previously in Figure
2. Second, the acknowledgement that the Department of
Defense, particularly the Department of the Navy, will
continue to become more involved in maritime interdiction
efforts leads Coast Guard law enforcement strategists to
consider joint operations in the counternarcotics effort.
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2. The Traditional Maritime Law Enforcement Mission
Traditionally, maritime law enforcement has been the
preserve of the Coast Guard. The history of the Coast Guard
role in maritime interdiction is almost as old as that of the
United States. The Coast Guard's roots date back to the
birth of our fledgling nation's Revenue Cutter Service, which
was established by Congress on August 4, 1790. The service
was to act as the maritime strong arm of Treasury Secretary
Alexander Hamilton as he attempted to enforce American
tariffs. [Ref. l0:pp. 32-34]
The missions of the Coast Guard in the 1990s are a
far cry from those of the Revenue Cutter Service in 1790.
Today's Coast Guard missions may be divided into seven major
program areas: Enforcement of Laws and Treaties (ELT),
Search and Rescue (SAR), Aids to Navigation (ATON), Ice
Operations, Marine Environmental Protection, Marine Safety,
and Defense Readiness. It is under the auspices of the ELT
program that the Coast Guard carries out its role of maritime
drug interdiction.
3. The Navy's Role in Maritime Law Enforcement
The Department of Defense has been involved in drug
interdiction since 1971 [Ref. 13:p. 50]. However, it was not
until the 1980s that the Navy participated in any significant
drug interdiction actions, primarily because it did not have
authority to act on the high seas in a law enforcement
capacity. The Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385) adopted by
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Congress shortly after the Civil War specifically makes the
distinction between military and police powers. "Military
personnel were subject to legal restrictions that prevented
the services from becoming primary interdiction agencies."
[Ref. 13:p. 43] In 1981, an amendment to the Posse Comitatus
Act allowed the Department of Defense to legally support
civilian drug enforcement agencies in their drug interdiction
activities. The amendment authorized the military to furnish
information, equipment, facilities, training, and advice to
law enforcement agencies. Still without arrest authority,
U.S. Naval vessels participating in any drug interdiction
operations were thus augmented with U.S. Coast Guard Tactical
Law Enforcement Teams (TACLETs: consisting of four to six
Coast Guard personnel) who had the authority to conduct the
drug interdiction search and seizure missions. Unlike the
Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, a part of the
Department of Transportation, is exempt from the Posse
Comitatus Act.
The embarking of Coast Guard TACLETs in effect
extended the number of surface platforms and range of Coast
Guard drug interdiction operations. The Navy crew would
track and intercept a suspicious vessel and then let the
Coast Guard TACLET disembark to search and, if warranted,
seize the vessel and its cargo, and arrest its crew. During
the interdiction operation the Navy vessel would shift its
tactical control to the appropriate Coast Guard area
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commander, even to the extent of flying a Coast Guard ensign
from its mast during the boarding operation. Each Navy ship
with an embarked TACLET had essentially obtained the same
jurisdictional capability and responsibility of a Coast Guard
Cutter.
4. Problems Experienced with the Navy's Involvement in
Drua Interdiction
The impact and results of the Navy's participation in
drug interdiction in the 1980s have been limited. For
example, a 1983 drug smuggling vessel identification program
conducted by the Navy in cooperation with the U.S. Coast
Guard resulted in the seizure of only three drug smuggling
vessels. The Navy's reluctance in assuming additional roles
and missions, limitations and inflexibility due to
traditional mission requirements, and poor coordination by
drug and law enforcement agencies, have all contributed to
the Navy's diluted efforts in assisting to impede drug
trafficking.
a. Reluctance in Assuming Additional Roles and
Missions
Navy surface ship and squadron commanding
officers were often reluctant to vigorously take on drug
interdiction operations, due largely to competing operational
training and mission requirements. The numerous training and
operational demands already placed upon commanding officers
(e.g., Refresher Training and Fleet Exercises) were only com-
pounded with the additional burden of drug interdiction
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operations. Rewards and recognition for training and
operational readiness and excellence did not include drug
smuggling operations. Without full support by higher
echelons, commanding officers did not have the incentive nor
could they afford to spend additional resources on drug
interdiction activities. Drug interdiction was non-
traditional. "Senior military leadership were
traditionalists .... You've got to drag them kicking and
screaming into any mission that has to do with anything other
than closing and destroying the enemy." [Ref. 28:p. 12]
b. Limitations and Inflexibility Due to Other
Mission Requirements
The Navy's role in drug interdiction operations
in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico had also been limited
because very few ships routinely operated in these areas.
During fiscal year 1988, the Navy's strong resource
commitment and mission emphasis in the Persian Gulf and North
Arabian Sea regions redirected potential assets away from
drug smuggling operations and routes, and thus did not
significantly augment the maritime interdiction operations.
Despite having the TACLET assets on board, the missions of
these Navy vessels were not primarily tasked to conduct drug
interdiction. TACLETs embarked on Navy ships simply because
it was opportunistic, that is, a Navy vessel might be
transiting a known drug smuggling route or some intelligence
gathered by the Coast Guard indicated the ship might overtake
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a drug carrying vessel. Consequently, in many instances
there was no specific commitment to drug interdiction, and it
was, at best, a secondary mission for most units [Ref. 29].
In the early years during the initial implementation of the
TACLETs, the Navy did not dedicate many sailing days strictly
for drug operations.
The Navy's flexibility in the use of their ships
was very restrictive. Despite planning conferences with the
Coast Guard and the National Narcotics Border Interdiction
System (NNBIS), Navy vessels were not routinely training and
operating near drug smuggling routes.
The ships could divert from their naval duties for only a
limited distance or time. Consequently, the Coast Guard
did not judge it useful to use many of these steaming days
to place a Coast Guard officer (TACLET team) aboard a Navy
vessel. (Ref. 13:p. 55]
Dedicated Caribbean and Pacific interdiction came as a
follow-on to "pulses" of naval activity destined to transit
suspected areas of high narcotics trafficking. These pulses
were generally training or "showing the flag" missions with
stringent transit time restrictions. As a result, many
interdiction opportunities fell secondary to the primary
mission of making prompt port calls.
Naval aircraft, particularly the E-2C, had
significant opportunity for a role in the interdiction of air
smuggling activities. However, the aircraft were constantly
in demand in naval operations throughout the rest of the
world, making it increasingly difficult to participate in
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drug interdiction operations. The transfer of four E-2s to
the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs Service, and an E-2
wing structural problem made the availability of additional
Navy E-2 assets even more scarce.
c. Lack of Coordination
There was initially little coordination between
any of the federal, state and local law enforcement agencies
involved in enforcing drug laws, particularly in dealing with
the Department of Defense for assistance and use of DoD
assets. Drug enforcement efforts were decentralized and
fragmented, and intelligence gathered was scant and rarely
shared among agencies. There was often waste and inefficien-
cy due to the division of responsibilities and inter-agency
competition for recognition and budget dollars. [Ref. 30:pp.
85-91)
The purpose of the National Narcotics Border
Interdiction System (NNBIS), announced by President Reagan in
March of 1983, was in part to coordinate drug interdiction
efforts between these agencies and the military. In the
early stages, unfortunately, "this failed to strengthen the
government's hand as much as it might have, because law
enforcement officers' limited knowledge of Department of
Defense procedures prevented them from using the military
resources effectively." [Ref. 31:pp. 95-96] The dedication
of Navy surface ships, P-3 patrol planes, and E-2 and S-3
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surveillance aircraft had limited success because agencies
did not make full or effective use of these assets.
5. Recent Trends in Joint Narcotics Interdiction
In 1988 Congress designated the Department of Defense
as the lead agency to detect and monitor both maritime and
air drug smuggling into the United States [Ref. 32:p. 112].
With this Congressional action, the DOD was given the added
responsibility of coordinating federal drug interdiction
detection and monitoring activities. This mandated drug
interdiction policy has prompted the Secretary of Defense to
review numerous proposals for the military's actual
involvement and possible expansion in drug interdiction
efforts.
In the interim, the Navy has proposed keeping an
aircraft carrier battle group or an amphibious task force off
the Columbian borders in the Caribbean Sea throughout 1990.
It is also envisioned that additional ships and aircraft
could be sent near Columbia to conduct monthly training
missions which are currently conducted in the Atlantic off
the coast of Florida. [Ref. 29]
Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) and
Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic (COMNAVSURFLANT)
support of the drug interdiction mission has improved
dramatically with the creation of CINCLANTFLT's new Joint
Task Force 4 (Key West, Florida), to coordinate the joint
narcotics interdiction effort on the east and gulf coasts.
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In addition, the recent implementation of a joint Coast Guard
and Navy Caribbean squadron has significantly increased the
naval presence in drug interdiction operations and
constituted the largest joint Coast Guard-Navy operation
since World War II. [Ref. 33:p. 101]
Joint Task Force Five (Alameda, California) plays the
key role of coordinating the detection and monitoring phases
of interdiction on the west coast. The intelligence queueing
function served by the Joint Task Force is fundamentally
important to every agency that conducts counternarcotics
operations. [Ref. 34]
Consequently, Coast Guard and Navy interoperability
has improved. Today, joint Coast Guard and Navy drug
operations include
...a force make-up for a typical operation normally includ-
ing a Belknap (CG-26) class cruiser, Coontz (DDG-40) class
destroyer, or Spruance (DD-963) class destroyer as
flagship; several frigates (FFG/FF); high or medium
endurance cutters (WHEC/WMEC); and an oiler. Amphibious
and support ships (LKA/LPD/LST), patrol hydrofoils, and
Coast Guard sea-based patrol boats also have augmented the
force. Squadron fixed wing assets include Navy P-3 and
Coast Guard C-130 surveillance aircraft, and embarked heli-
copters. [Ref. 33:p. 103]
a. Incorporating Multiple Missions into Single
Operations
Clearly, the Navy has begun to gear up to the
task of narcotics interdiction, as CAPT J. W Lockwood, USCG,
former Caribbean Squadron Commander notes:
The Navy's continuing support, with almost 100 of the
Second Fleet's ships that have sailed on squadron
operations, have made the m more than wary. They
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must now consider every gray ship that looms on the horizon
to be a threat, whether or not the ship is actually engaged
in law enforcement operations and has a (TACLET) embarked.
As more and more ships sail with the squadron--some
repeatedly, like the McCloy (FF-1038), leading all Navy
units with six seizures--their officers and crews become
'drug smart,' and report suspect vessels and possible drug-
related activity, even while executing other Navy
tasking. [Ref. 33:p. 104]
Joint narcotics interdiction can logistically
succeed through use of the traditional multimission
philosophy, which incorporates multiple missions into single
operations. Thus, Navy and Coast Guard military readiness
operations can be used to support the interdiction effort.
Joint narcotics interdiction as a part of the multimission
philosophy provides the following to each of the
participating services:
1. Assists defining realistic roles for the defense readi-
ness mission--joint narcotics interdiction is a
tangible addition to improved readiness from military
operations.
2. Increased assistance for narcotics smuggling detection
and interdiction--as each new participant becomes more
familiar and involved, more detection and--ultimately--
narcotics interdiction will result.
3. Potentially more efficient use of funds in readiness
and operational areas--in the face of future budget
austerity, and during times when narcotics interdiction
enjoys high visibility and is a Congressional priority,
multimission accomplishment that includes drug
interdiction, will serve as a more efficient use of
resources.
4. opportunity to develop and use hybrid tactics for use
in military and interdiction operations--fighting the
drug war in which the law breakers use similar tactics
to small insurgent forces, yet who rarely shoot back,
offers an opportunity to fight a bona fide enemy with
low risks.
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5. Operational experience in geographic areas of vital
interest to U.S security--expanding joint operations,
normally conducted in the North Atlantic or off the
Florida coast, to Caribbean waters will familiarize the
forces with an area fast-becoming a zone of strategic
importance. [Ref. 35:pp. 20-21]
b. Coast Guard Reaction to Department of Defense
Involvement in Joint Interdiction Operations
Congress has occasionally augmented the Coast
Guard's Operating Expenses and/or Acquisition, Construction
and Improvements (AC&I) with DoD resources. This has been in
the form of direct transfers of funds to Coast Guard
appropriations, establishment of a special account that the
Coast Guard can draw from for specific purposes (the Coastal
Defense Augmentation Account--CDAA), the provision of
"services-in-kind" using DoD personnel, and time and supplies
valued at specific dollar amounts. In FY-1989, the
establishment of a separate appropriation, funded from DoD's
Military Construction (MILCON, account, augmented Coast Guard
Shore Facility projects. Specifically, from FY-1983 to FY-
1989, over $1.3 billion of DoD budgetary resources have been
provided to the Coast Guard ($519.0 million to Operating
Expenses and $850.3 million to AC&I). [Ref. 36]
The Coast Guard benefits from DoD funds targeted
toward boosting efforts in the ELT and Defense Readiness
program areas. The service has been able to maintain an
increased ELT posture by using the resources provided by the
DoD. Focusing on the Navy's contribution to Coast Guard ELT
efforts, the Coast Guard enjoys several benefits from DoD
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involvement in the interdiction arena. When a Coast Guard
TACLET rides a USN vessel on a transit through Caribbean
waters, it frees a Coast Guard surface unit from a dedicated
patrol in the same area. The cost is minimized for the Coast
Guard because the cost for a Coast Guard Cutter in the area
is replaced by the cost of embarking the TACLET on the USN
vessel. The Naval vessel offers a typically broader, more
effective monitoring and detection capability to enhance the
interdiction effort, and the Navy's cost is limited to the
opportunity cost of the time spent conducting an actual
interdiction boarding operation with a suspect vessel. The
benefits to the Coast Guard of increased use of DoD
resources, decreased demand on Coast Guard resources, and
more effective surveillance capability appear to outweigh the
difficulties of the administrative and logistic coordination
effort between the services.
c. Joint Interdiction and USN Outlays
As discussed earlier, the Navy, until recently,
has not considered law enforcement as one of its primary mis-
sions. Consequently, although it is the much larger service,
the Navy has spent less on drug interdiction than the Coast
Guard (Tables 4 and 5).
Within the last year the Navy has placed
increased emphasis in this area, primarily due to Congres-
sional mandate and the Navy's new willingness to accept drug
interdiction as a peacetime mission. This year Congress has
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TABLE 4
COAST GUARD ELT FUNDING PROFILE
($ in millions)
FY-1987 FY-1988 FY-1989
Funding for ELT $ 825.0 805.9 945.7
Total USCG Funding 32,239.9 2,175.2 2,576.5
ELT Z of Total USCG Funding 36.7 37.0 36.7
Source: USCG Budget in Brief - Fiscal Year 1990
TABLE 5
DON DRUG INTERDICTION OUTLAYS
($ in millions)
FY-1987 FY-1988 FY-1989
A/C Subtotal $11.12 9.58 11.15
Surface Asset Subtotal $26.30 24.00 19.00
Total Interdiction Outlays $37.42 33.58 30.15
Total DON Outlays ($billion) $90.81 91.70 95.18
Interdiction % of Total 0.041 0.037 0.032
Source: OPNAV 642 Washington, DC
earmarked $450 million of the DOD's budget for "the war on
drugs." [Ref. 37:p. 8]
Despite the huge increase in law enforcement
spending by the Navy, the Coast Guard also intends to
increase its spending on narcotics interdiction, with the ELT
percentage of total Coast Guard funding decreasing only
slightly. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence available
does not provide a sufficient database to more accurately
assess the Navy's contribution toward narcotics interdiction.
Table 5 contains information only from FY-1987 to FY-1989
because the Navy figures available prior to then are of
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questionable accuracy [Ref. 38]. The decrease in outlays
(both in terms of absolute dollars and common size analysis)
for drug interdiction during those years is primarily due to
the diversion of resources to the Persian Gulf.
D. MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT EXPECTATIONS
The strategic planning process of an organization rests
on the fulfilling of its basic socioeconomic responsibilities
[Ref. 7:p. 128]. This illustrates why the Coast Guard
considers environmental forces--both within and outside the
service--ir a more than offhand manner.
The analysis of expectations incorporates steps two
through five of Bryson's strategic planning process, which
considers Mandates, Missions/Values, the External
Environment, and the Internal Environment [Ref. 8:p. 48].
Further, the expectations of stakeholders in the law
enforcement missio:, area contribute to identifying the
strategic issues facing the Coast Guard. Thus, external and
internal expectations significantly affect the Coast Guard's
law enforcement strategy development.
1. An Overview
The law enforcement strategy process is affected by
expectations concerning the future environment in which the
Coast Guard will operate. In the ELT mission area, Coast
Guard strategy is based upon not only its own expectations,
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but those from within the DoD organization as well as
anticipations from outside the USCG/DoD community.
2. Expectaticns Outside the USCG/DoD Community
The United States has achieved a heightened
consciousness concerning its drug problem. Recent opinion
polls indicate that the nation's drug problem is one of the
most important issues facing this country (Ref. 39:p. 34].
In the eyes of many in Congress, international drug smuggling
has become a national security issue. In 1986, President
Reagan declared a "war" on drugs and claimed that drug
smuggling was a threat to national security. There has been
considerable debate as to what should be the United States
Navy's role in drug interdiction. Proponents in favor of
increasing the Navy's part in interdiction operations contest
that the service is ideally suited to combat drug trafficking
in the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and Pacific Ocean
regions. The Navy has the necessary resources, manpower and
equipment, and could simultaneously obtain practical training
opportunities without sacrificing military readiness.
Conversely, opponents to the Navy's role in drug interdiction
challenge that drug trafficking is a law enforcement issue
and not a military mission.
Drug enforcement is an unconventional war which the
military is ill-equipped to fight; that a drug enforcement
mission detracts from readiness; that it is unwise public
policy to require the U.S. military to operate against U.S.
citizens; and that the use of the military may have serious
political and diplomatic repercussions overseas." (Ref.
13:p. v]
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Despite the hypothesis that a dollar spent on
reducing the demand for drugs is more effective than a dollar
spent toward interdicting the supply of drugs [Ref. 13:
Appendix I), the National Drug Control Strategy ("to make
drugs undesirable and hard to get through a mix of supply and
demand policies" [Ref. 32:p. 6]) still provides significant
emphasis on interdiction. Our nation's interdiction efforts
will be highlighted by an enhanced and expanded role for the
DoD in detecting and monitoring drug trafficking. Addition-
ally, the national strategy calls for increased integration
and coordination of air, land, and maritime interdiction
efforts. [Ref. 32:p. 64]
3. Expectations Within the DoD Community
In 1989, Defense Secretary Cheney directed commanders
of DoD's unified and specified commands to come up with plans
to interdict the flow of drugs into their particular areas of
responsibility. On March 9, 1990, the DoD announced a new
plan to boost current interdiction efforts. Under this plan,
the Pentagon will deploy additional ships and aircraft in the
Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean. The Atlantic Command will
continue to use four to five Navy ships with embarked Coast
Guard TACLETS and will significantly increase E-3 AWACs
flights into the Caribbean. Dedicated anti-drug ship days in
the Pacific will increase 146 percent over 1989 figures, and
DoD aircraft will fly in excess of 2600 dedicated counter-
narcotics hours in the Pacific, a 24 percent increase. The
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Pentagon plans to spend $1.2 billion on anti-drug operations
in FY-1991. This year DoD is spending $450 million on drug
interdiction, and in FY-1989 it spent $300 million. [Ref.
40:p. 10] These are indicators that the DoD has more
seriously accepted narcotics interdiction as a mission.
DoN resource representatives aren't so quick to leap
onto the interdiction bandwagon. Navy programmers state that
their service has an increased responsibility to prove itself
in a leaner defense scenario, and that the Navy will use
reimbursable DoD "interdiction dollars"--interdiction funds
placed in a centrally-managed DoD account and provided to DoD
resources as reimbursement for interdiction efforts funded
"out-of-pocket"--as a source of funding when tasked with
interdiction operations [Ref. 41]. The Navy is hesitant to
enter the interdiction arena because it doesn't want to
commit itself to funding the interdiction operations strictly
out of its own pocket. In essence, it would rather not
budget for and commit its resources toward interdiction
operations [Ref. 42]. The Navy will be able to use the
multimission philosophy noted earlier to combine its
operational missions with interdiction, and thus could use
the DoD interdiction funds to help finance some of its non-
counternarcotics operations [Ref. 43].
4. Expectations Within the Coast Guard Community
In 1986, when current Commandant Paul Yost took
office, he mandated a shift in mission emphasis for the Coast
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Guard. He dramatically altered the Coast Guard's mission mix
and its public image, and he made drug interdiction and
military readiness his top priorities. In 1984, SAR was
considered the service's primary mission, although its
funding amounted to 24.5 percent of total USCG Operating
Expenses compared to 27.3 percent for ELT. [Ref. 14:pp. 10-
11] In 1990, the trend toward law enforcement emphasis is
evident in the growing spread between the ELT and SAR




(in Millions of $)
Program 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
ELT 460.8 531.7 584.7 618.7 628.2 722.4 776.9
SAR 415.0 385.9 319.5 408.8 423.4 468.2 491.1
ATON 370.3 362.7 371.7 409.5 406.6 452.9 465.2
Other 444.4 473.3 472.0 470.3 450.9 478.9 509.0
Total 1,690.5 1,753.6 1,747.9 J,907.3 1,909.1 2,122.4 2,242.2
(Source: USCG Budget in BzLef FY-1990)
Common Size Analysis
Program 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
ELT 27.32 30.3 33.5 32.4 32.9 34.1 34.7
SAR 24.5 22.0 18.3 21.4 22.2 22.1 21.9
ATON 21.9 20.7 21.2 21.5 21.3 21.3 20.7
Other 26.3 27.0 27.0 24.7 23.6 22.5 22.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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IV. COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY
A. AN OVERVIEW
The Coast Guard formal law enforcement strategy consists
of three essential elements: goals (or objectives) to be
achieved, the most significant DOlicies guiding or limiting
action, and the major action seauences (or programs) that are
to accomplish the defined goals within the limits set. [Ref.
6:pp. 7-8]
The realized law enforcement strategy results from a
pattern in a stream of actions, as seen in Figure 3. The
intended strategy, or what is designed, is exhibited by the
National Drug Control Strategy, the Department of
Transportation strategy, and the Coast Guard Commandant's
agenda. The deliberate strategies, where intentions existed
and were then realized, differ from emergent strategies,
where patterns developed in the absence of intentions, which
went unrealized [Ref. 44:p. 15]. These emergent strategies
often result from the impact of public opinion and the
budgeting process.
The emphasis here is that the Coast Guard's realized law
enforcement strategy is formed partly in response to the
strategy intentions of the National and Department of Trans-
portation strategies. However, the significant development
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Figure 3. Forms of Strategy
impacts of the strategy designs of the Coast Guard
Commandant's agenda and the emergent strategies formed in
reacting to public opinion and the budget process.
B. THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY
In January of 1990, the White House issued its National
Drug Control Strategy. Basically, the national strategy is
...designed to erode the power and spread of drugs by
consistently keeping pressure on all the avenues through
which illegal drugs are made available or desirable and,
further, to hold those who use drugs accountable for their
actions. [Ref. 32:p. 2]
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1. An Overview
The fundamental principal of the national strategy is
to make drugs undesirable and hard to obtain through a mix of
supply and demand policies [Ref. 32:p. 6]. The National Drug
Control Strategy's supply reduction policies serve as
guidance for Coast Guard law enforcement strategy
development.
There are three modes of the supply side of narcotics
smuggling. First is the in-country mode, which spans from
drug production to conveyance out of the producing country.
Second is the transportation mode during which the narcotics
are smuggled via air, air-to-surface, or surface routes to
the consuming nation. The third supply side mode, the
investigative mode, exists from the moment the narcotics
enter the consumer country until the drugs are in the hands
of the consumer. [Ref. 45] Coast Guard interdiction occurs
during the transportation mode of the narcotics supply side,
as depicted in Figure 4.
The Coast Guard is a participant in the Organized
Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Program (OCDETF). As shown
in Figure 5, the OCDETF consists of nine federal agencies as
well as state and local law enforcement offices. The purpose
of OCDETF is to "coordinate investigation and prosecution of
highly sophisticated and diversified criminal drug related
and money laundering enterprises." [Ref. 32:p. 16] Each
participant in the OCDETF forms a strategy to fulfill the
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Transportation Mode
purpose of the program. These individual strategies are
affected by the approaches of the other participants. This
highlights the dynamic process at the national level that
emphasizes the importance of strategy integration and
congruence among the participants.
2. Coast Guard Specific Initiatives
The National Drug Control Strategy highlights several
initiatives which particularly involve Coast Guard
participation. First, the national strategy emphasizes
interagency intelligence collecting, collating, and
disseminating. Intelligence provides the key toward learning
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The Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force
(OCDETF) Agencies
se igr OCDETF enf es
about the character of criminal organizations, their
structures, activities, bases of operations, and movements of
individual members. [Ref. 32:p. 17]
Second, the national strategy focuses on
international initiatives as part of its supply reduction
policy. The cornerstone of the international drug control
strategy is to work with and motivate other countries to
engage their own resources and efforts to defeat the drug
trade. The Department of State is specifically tasked to
coordinate U.S. agency assistance to other countries [Ref.
32:pp. 49-52]. Frequently the Coast Guard is tasked with
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providing such assistance for several reasons, among them
are:
1. Using the Coast Guard doesn't appear as politically or
militarily offensive as using DoD resources. The
white-hulled Coast Guard Cutters typically offer a
"non-defense" assistance avenue of entry that gray
hulls don't have. [Ref. 46]
2. The Coast Guard, as part of the nation's counternar-
cotics force, fulfills the national strategy of
enhancing relations with central American nations.
3. Coast Guardsmen are recognized as riverine specialists,
which make them ideally suited for in-country
operations. The service and its missions closely match
those missions of the smaller nation's naval force.
[Ref. 47]
Third, the national strategy emphasizes interdiction
efforts whose goal is to deter drug smuggling by intercepting
and seizing illegal drug shipments entering the U.S., thereby
consistently disrupting narcotics trafficking operations.
Four interdiction highlights of the national strategy have an
effect on the development of Coast Guard law enforcement
strategy. These are:
1. Enhanced and expanded role for the Department of
Defense in the detection and monitoring of drug
trafficking.
2. Improved coordination of air, land, and maritime
interdiction efforts to deter and interrupt drug
smuggling and illegal shipments of drug-related money,
munitions, and precursor chemicals as they enter or
leave the country.
3. Improved automated data processing equipment for use by
the U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard.
4. Completion of the Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence (C31) systems, and their integration with
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the Department of Defense Joint Task Forces. [Ref.
32:p. 64]
The Coast Guard participates in both air and maritime
narcotics interdiction. The national strategy addresses both
efforts.
a. Air Interdiction
The principal goal of the air interdiction effort
is to deter general aviation aircraft pilots from transport-
ing illegal drugs toward or into the United States. A
secondary goal is to prevent them from delivering their
cargo. [Ref. 32:p. 66)
There are three methods of air interdiction which
support the national strategy, and the Coast Guard
contributes to each mode. First, detection will be augmented
by land- and sea-based aerostats which will provide radar
coverage of selected areas. Second, improved intelligence
support will assist the air target sorting process. Third,
physical interdiction of smuggling flights with aircraft
resources provides the final step toward achieving the air
interdiction goals. [Ref. 32:p. 67]
b. Maritime Interdiction
The goal of the maritime interdiction strategy is
to deter drug smugglers, deny seaborne smuggling routes, and
detect and seize drug-smuggling vessels and arrest their
crews (Ref. 32:p. 68]. The maritime interdiction strategy
employs four means of achieving its goal.
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First, interdiction forces can focus on
predictable geographic choke points to target suspect
vessels. Second, instead of relying on inefficient and
ineffective random patrols in vast bodies of water, the
maritime interdiction effort will rely heavily on
intelligence reports to target specific smuggling vessels.
Third, increased cooperative efforts with drug source and
transit countries will augment the collection of source
country intelligence. Fourth, the Administration will also,
through the Department of State, seek additional agreements
with foreign countries to build on the successful Coast Guard
Shiprider program. This program will serve as a tangible
link between the United States and other countries in their
efforts toward maritime interdiction.
Thus, a set of goals, policies, and action
sequences exists at the national level to constitute a drug
control strategy. This national strategy serves in part to
influence the direction Coast Guard strategy makers take when
developing the service's law enforcement strategy.
C. THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY
The Department of Transportation supports the national
drug control strategy by including the issue in its
strategies for action. The national transportation policy
endorses Coast Guard involvement in the counternarcotics
effort. Therefore, the National Transportation Policy,
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combined with the National Drug Control Strategy, serves as
guidance for Coast Guard strategy makers in developing a law
enforcement strategy.
1. An Overview
As noted earlier, the Coast Guard operates within the
Department of Transportation (DoT) during peacetime. The
mission of the DoT, as set forth in the legislation
establishing the department is, in part, to "achieve
transportation objectives considering the needs of the
public, users, carriers, industry, labor, and national
defense." [Ref. 48:p. 1] During peacetime and wartime, the
nation's civilian transportation system and the Coast Guard
are vital to supporting national defense.
The next step down from the President in the Coast
Guard's chain of command is the Secretary of the DoT. A
second source of guidance from the national level to the
Coast Guard's development of its law enforcement strategy
comes from the DoT agenda. In its "Strategies for Action,"
the DoT sets directions for national transportation policy,
which are captured under six major themes, one of them being
to "Ensure that the transportation system supports the public
safety and national security." [Ref. 48:p. vii]
Regarding this concern about supporting national
security, the DoT acknowledges that the flow of drugs into
this country is a major security issue. Recognizing that
drug-related crimes have become a focus of concern across the
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United States, the DoT supports efforts to track and
intercept drug shipments moving into the country and through
the transportation system. [Ref. 48:p. 32]
2. The Coast Guard Role in the Department of
Transportation Drug Control Strategy
The United States provides a major world market for
the drug trade, and it is a top priority in the President's
strategy to halt the import of illegal drugs into this
country. Transportation is involved in moving drugs across
U.S. borders and within the states. Just as the National
Drug Control Strategy highlights several initiatives which
involve Coast Guard participation, the DoT strategy includes
the service as its major contributor to the antidrug effort.
The Coast Guard plays a centrally important role in
the DoT's counternarcotics endeavor. This is indicated by
the amount of resources dedicated to the Coast Guard from the
DoT's share of national drug control funding. As seen in
Table 7, the Coast Guard received over 98 percent of DoT's
antidrug funding in FY 1989. This endowment is projected to
exceed 95 percent in FY 1990 and 94 percent in FY 1991.
As stated in the DoT's strategy, it is federal trans-
portation policy to: (1) Maintain Coast Guard surveillance
on and over the waters to interdict illicit drugs coming from
other countries to U.S. shores; and (2) Assist in reducing
illegal drug traffic moving on the nation's transportation
system, including the maritime system. [Ref. 48:p. 94]
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TABLE 7
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET SUMMARY
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
(Budget Authority in millions of dollars)
FY 89 (act) FY 90 (est) FY 91 (req)
USCG 633.5 675.0 731.5
FAA 7.5 22.4 31.4
NHTSA 2.0 6.1 9.7
Total 643.0 703.5 772.6
The national transportation policy sets forth both a
long-term strategic planning perspective and a short-term
program agenda that addresses the DoT role in the nation's
counternarcotics effort. The DoT's strategic focus for the
future will be to ensure that the transportation system can
perform its basic function efficiently and safely through
efforts to: (1) Remain flexible enough to adapt to changing
circumstances; and (2) Provide the means and incentives for
funds and other resources to be targeted to projects and
programs that offer the greatest benefits in the nation's
transportation system. [Ref. 48:p. 126]
Finally, the DoT offers a general short-term program
agenda that endorses Coast Guard participation in reducing
the import of illegal drugs into the country. To accomplish
this, the short-term program agenda focuses on two
directives. First, to maintain Coast Guard surveillance on
and over the waters and continue Federal Aviation
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Administration support to law enforcement agencies to
interdict illicit drugs. Second, to work closely with the
Office of National Drug Control Policy and other agencies to
reduce illegal drug traffic moving on the nation's
transportation system. [Ref. 48:p. 124]
D. THE COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY
1. An Overview
Coast Guard law enforcement strategv deals with
deployments over wide spaces, long times and large movements,
and before contact with the "enemy." Tactics relate to the
actions on the battlefield itself [Ref. l:p. 63]. Quinn
notes that the primary difference between strategies and
tactics lies in the scale of action or the perspective of the
leader [Ref. 6:p. 3]. The Coast Guard's law enforcement
strategy can be viewed as supporting the Grand Strategy (the
National Drug Control Strategy), which employs all the
resources of the nation to achieve policy objectives [Ref.
1:p. 63].
The Coast Guard develops its law enforcement strategy
based upon the significant factors discussed earlier. These
factors are embodied in the "Grand" National Drug Control
Strategy (expectations outside the Coast Guard community, the
Coast Guard role in law enforcement, public opinion), the
Commandant's agenda (expectations within the Coast Guard
community, the Coast Guard role in law enforcement, the Coast
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Guard's culture), and public opinion (which includes the
budget).
2. The Coast Guard Law Enforcement Mission
The Coast Guard law enforcement mission consists of
more than narcotics interdiction. Among the duties the
service performs to enforce federal laws on the high seas and
in U.S. waters are interdicting drug smugglers and illegal
migrants, enforcing Exclusive Economic Zone laws and
regulations up to 200 miles off the nation's shores,
inspecting domestic and foreign fishing vessels, and
assisting other agencies to enforce U.S. laws. [Ref. 49:p.
17]
Enforcement of Laws and Treaties (ELT) is the largest
of the Coast Guard's seven mission areas in terms of budgeted
funding. Recalling Table 6, in FY 1990 over 34 percent of
Coast Guard operating expenses are budgeted toward the ELT
mission. Today, the Coast Guard's counternarcotics effort
has arguably made ELT the service's most visible mission.
3. A "WOTS UP" Analysis of Coast Guard Law Enforcement
The strategies which result from a strategic planning
process focus on achieving the best "fit" between an
organization and its environment [Ref. 8:p. 56]. One method
used to identify strategic issues is called the "WOTS UP"
analysis. WOTS UP is an acronym for Weaknesses,
Opportunities, Threats, and Strengths underlying planning
[Ref. 7:pp. 19-20].
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Through the exercise of research for this study,
including several personal and telephone interviews with
Coast Guard personnel, the author has identified some of the
WOTS regarding the Coast Guard's ELT mission. This WOTS UP
analysis is subject to debate and disagreement, as Steiner
notes, "Agreement is made more difficult by the fact that
managers at different levels inevitably come to different
conclusions.... " [Ref. 7:p. 146]
The results of this WOTS UP analysis are summarized
in Tables 8 through 11.
TABLE 8
USCG ELT MISSION WEAKNESSES SUMMARY
1. No formally stated long range strategy.
2. CG's multimission capability requirement inhibits intensive, specialized training
for ELT, which affects strategy development.
3. No good measure of effectiveness.
4. Unsure if the changing marginal value of interdiction is greater than the increasing
marginal value of resources employed.
5. No clear definition of interdiction - departure zone (more effective at stopping
drug flow) versus arrival zone (more arrest/seizure numbers.)
6. Strategy reacts to threat assessment and other agency actions, is not proactive.
7. Personnel identity crisis - "Lifesavers" versus "Smokeys of the Sea."
8. Unable to quickly respond to the threat with budget dollars.
9. High tech force structure won't be necessary if ELT emphasis shifts from
counternarcotics.
10. Not enough emphasis on feedback to refine operational techniques.
11. Weak integration (particularly communications) among interdiction participants.
12. Tendency to focus on short term (what we're doing) rather than long term emphasis
(where we're going.)
13. Assets are easily surveilled by enemy.
14. Rules of engagement force predictability of response to threats.
15. Increased DoD involvement adds another layer to law enforcement bureaucracy.
66
TABLE 9
USCG ELT MISSION OPPORTUNITIES SUMMARY
1. Heightened antidrug sentiment--more funding.
2. Redevelop infrastructure with increased funding.
3. An overall stronger service resulting from synergy associated with multiple mission
capabilities.
4. Give up certain ELT responsibilities.
5. Shift resources to other missions as DoD assumes a greater counternarcotics role.
6. Work closely with DoD, using their resources and USCG authority.
7. More involvement in the international arena.
TABLE 10
USCG ELT MISSION THREATS SUMMARY
1. Competition for resources:
a. for drug control funding (DoD/USCS/DEA/FBI)
b. for DoT funding (AMTRAK/FAA/NHTSA).
2. Increased Congressional oversight slows fiscal process and generates unwieldy
requirements.
3. DoD support of the USCG budget may diminish or disappear.
4. Interest groups sway public opinion and affect strategy designs.
5. "False Threat" is DoD assuming ELT mission - USCG has other ELT missions emphasis,
DoD has no statutory authority, DoD doesn't establish detection and monitoring
requirements.
6. Decreased funding as public opinion shifts away from its anti-drug emphasis toward
other interests (such as environmental protection.)
7. Decreased funding as national drug control shifts away from supply reduction toward
demand abatement.
TABLE 11
USCG ELT MISSION STRENGTHS SUMMARY
1. Public opinion--approval of the Coast Guard image.
2. Increased skill at marketing the service's capabilities.
3. Multimission capabilities.
4. Synergy from multiple mission capabilities.
5. "Other" responsibilities within ELT mission--Fisheries, Safety, Migrant
Interdiction, Foreign Security Training.
6. Aggressive in seeking out now missions and funding.
7. Resilient personnel with mission enthusiasm.
8. Increased capacity to process intelligence.
9. Quick operational response capability.
This WOTS UP analysis indicates two strategic issues
whose themes recur throughout the list of characteristics.
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First, the Coast Guard must be sensitive to the present and
future needs of the public and mandates from the
Administration (concerning missions and policies) and
Congress (regarding the budget). In doing so, the Coast
Guard follows an agenda set by its Commandant. Second, the
service must strive to maintain its multimission capability
and corresponding force structure. The multimission
capability and force structure enhance the Coast Guard's
capacity to respond to emerging situations and trends.
4. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Strategv Development
The Coast Guard law enforcement strategy addresses
the strategic issues identified by the ELT mission WOTS UP
analysis. The service has developed an informal,
decentralized law enforcement strategy that essentially
performs two functions. First, the strategy follows the
directives dictated by the National Drug Control Strategy and
the DoT Strategies for Action. Secondly, the strategy
maintairs a service-wide mission and resource flexibility
that places emphasis on coordinating the efforts of a
multituda of interdiction assets to respond to emergent
political, economic, and military situations. This supports
what Quinn describes as
...the essence of strategy...is to build a posture that is
so strong (and potentially flexible) in selective ways that
the organization can achieve its goals despite the
unforeseeable ways external forces may interact when the
time comes. [Ref. 6:p. 8]
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The decentralized strategy development process runs
headlong into the requirement for coordination (Ref. 50:p.
319]. This need for coordination emphasizes the importance
of the Coast Guard Commandant's agenda. His strategy
functions to provide coherence to organizational action (Ref.
51:p. 52].
Allison cites that government consists of a
conglomerate of semifeudal, loosely allied organizations,
each with a substantial life of its own (Ref. 50:p. 317].
The Coast Guard is one of those government organizations that
attends to a special set of problems and acts in quasi-
independence on these problems. Allison further notes that,
"Government leaders can substantially disturb, but not
substantially control, the behavior of these organizations."
[Ref. 50:p. 317] For example, in 1988 Coast Guard Commandant
Paul Yost mounted his own successful campaign with Congress
to restore $60 million of a $103 million shortfall--without
the outward support of the Administration [Ref. 52:p. 2].
This highlights the importance of the Commandant's agenda and
actions in Coast Guard law enforcement strategy development.
The Coast Guard's ELT strategy is evident in the
efforts of its Commandant to rejuvenate the service's force
structure. Admiral Yost focuses on the image of the Coast
Guard as an integral part of defending our national security
interests in the war on drugs. Thus, strategy development
moves from a definition used by General U.S. Grant in the
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1860s, "Strategy is the deployment of one's resources in a
manner which is most likely to defeat the enemy," to the
strategy of seeking and maintaining a sustainable advantage.
Von Clausewitz stated that strategy is maneuvering for
competitive advantage toward a desired goal [Ref. 53:p. 165],
which implies flexibility, an on-going process, understanding
goals, and internal and external competition [Ref. 54].
Importantly, in the public eyc and in the opinion of
Congress, the Coast Guard is now considered a viable defense
force with a multimission capability [Ref. 55:p. 12].
Admiral Yost has packaged a new product, and it's selling
well in Congress based upon appropriation response.
F. LAW ENFORCEMENT PLANNING AND BUDGETING FOR INTERDICTION
1. An Overview
The primary document in the Coast Guard planning
process is the Commandant's Long Range View. In it the
Commandant sets forth his view of the environment in which
the Coast Guard will be operating over the next 25 years.
For example, the current Long Range View forecasts sustained
involvement in deterring drug trafficking and use in the
maritime region [Ref. 56:p. 16]. These projections combine
with formally-stated objectives (such as "to enforce federal
laws and international agreements on and under the waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and on and
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under the high seas where authorized." [Ref. 57:p. 1-2]) to
provide specific policy guidance for Coast Guard planners.
In October 1965, President Johnson directed the
introduction of a Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
(PPBS) approach for the entire Executive Branch. The Coast
Guard was among the first of the non-DoD agencies to comply.
The basic PPBS approach has proven to be sufficiently
flexible to accommodate the changes time has brought and is
used Coast Guard-wide. [Ref. 57:p. 1-1]
2. The Coast Guard Law Enforcement Budget
The Coast Guard's budget serves as the integrating
method to translate its strategic plans into current actions.
The budget sets standards for coordinated action and provides
a basis for controlling performance to see that it is in
conformance with strategic planning [Ref. 7:pp. 215-218].
Performance measures are difficult to enumerate in the ELT
mission. "Body counts," or measures of interdiction
effectiveness (arrests made, kilos of cocaine seized,
convictions gained, etc.), don't provide a complete or valid
assessment of how well the Coast Guard is doing in its ELT
mission [Ref. 58]. However, Congress appears content to use
such figures as a yardstick of future federal funding when
the narcotics funding pie is cut each year. Citing Wildavsky
again, the Coast Guard budget is "a link between financial
resources and human behavior in accomplishing policy objec-
tives." [Ref. 26:p. 2]
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There is often a tendency for budgeting to drive out
strategic thought and action. The Coast Guard's ability to
carry out its strategy is closely linked to its resources,
and the strength of Coast Guard resources is tied to the
budgeting process. It is increasingly difficult to implement
a long-term strategy when the strategy is intimately tied to
a short-term budgeting process. The Coast Guard's effort to
develop and execute a strategy, like other agencies in the
federal government, is hampered by a shortsighted budget
process. [Ref. 47]
3. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Strategic Path Programs
The Coast Guard will continue to use its high profile
law enforcement mission as a springboard toward funding new
programs. Since the 1986 anti-drug legislation was passed,
the Coast Guard has successfully accomplished a major force
structure overhaul that encompassed the following
acquisitions:
1. Sophisticated HU-25C Falcon interceptors modified with
F-16 radar.
2. Navy E-2C Hawkeye radar planes for long range
surveillance.
3. HH-3F Pelican helicopters being replaced by HH-60J
Jayhawks.
4. Outfit C-130s with E-2C radar.
5. Operate land-based aerostat radar system.
6. Procure 110-foot patrol boat fleet. [Ref. 14:p. 13]
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The need to make sure that strategic thinking
precedes, rather than follows, budgeting is most important.
Through its version of PPBS, the Coast Guard has budgets and
budgeting procedures in place to capitalize on strategic
planning and strategic plans [Ref. 8:p. 181). The FY-1991
Coast Guard budget request includes the following:
1. $2.391 billion for Operating Expenses (a 6 percent
increase).
2. $419.5 million for AC&I to pay for fleet renovation and
modernization of High Endurance cutters, renovation of
Medium Endurance cutters, motorboat replacement
program, HH-6CJ helicopter procurement.
3. $23 million for Research and Development.
4. $78.9 million for Reserve Training. (Ref. 55:p. 12]
Thus, the Coast Guard's strategy is evident in its
budget. The budget reflects: (1) the need to update its
force structure, and (2) a continued commitment toward its
ELT mission in response to public opinion and in support of
the National Drug Control Strategy. The question remains
whether the state of the art equipment now dedicated to the
high technology counternarcotics effort is needed or




The key points highlighted by the thesis are summarized
along with the principal findings regarding the research
questions posed in the introduction. Finally, the author
closes with a recommendation that the Coast Guard should
formally state its long-range law enforcement strategy.
A. SUMMARY
This study traced the development of the Coast Guard's
law enforcement strategy. Starting from a theoretical
discussion of the concept of strategy, the author answered
the questions "What is strategy?", "What is a strategist?"
and "What is strategic planning?" The central notion
developed is that there is no single, universal definition of
strategy. However, recurring themes occur in each strategy
definition, specifically, that strategy is a never-ending
process that is dominated by a sense of purpose regarding the
future of an individual or organization.
The Coast Guard's law enforcement strategy will be
significantly affected by four factors throughout the 1990s.
These factors are the Coast Guard's organizational culture,
public opinion, the service's perceived role in maritime law
enforcement, and maritime law enforcement expectations.
74
This paper introduced maritime law enforcement as a
mission served traditionally by the Coast Guard and recently
by the Department of Defense. The Coast Guard's law
enforcement strategy, although decentralized and informal, is
a guide for its planning and budgeting processes. The
strategy emphasizes maintaining a multimission capability to
respond to the needs of the public and mandates of the
Administration and Congress. The Commandant's agenda is a
key factor in developing and acting on the service's
strategy.
Finally, the Coast Guard has used its enhanced image in
the public sector as a marketing tool to boost Congressional
support of its programs, particularly those which deal
directly with the ELT mission. In this sense, Congressional
backing comes in the form of funding, which is being used to
augment and update the Coast Guard's force structure.
This thesis set out to address particular research
questions. The following sections reiterate those questions
and provide a summary of the response to those questions
based upon the author's research findings.
B. PRIMARY FINDINGS
The Coast Guard's law enforcement mission is to enforce
all federal laws in the marine environment, except those
specifically assigned to other Coast Guard programs. The
multidimensional law enforcement program includes
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interdicting drug smugglers and illegal migrants, enforcing
Exclusive Economic Zone laws and regulations, inspecting
fishing vessels for compliance with U.S. laws, and assisting
other agencies to enforce U.S. laws. This study focused
primarily on the counternarcotics objective of Coast Guard
law enforcement.
1. What is the Coast Guard Law Enforcement Strategy ....
There is no formally stated long-range Coast Guard
law enforcement strategy to date. To identify the Coast
Guard's law enforcement strategy, we must define the pattern
of purposes, policies, programs, actions, decisions, or
resource allocations that define what the organization is,
what it does, and why it does it [Ref. 8:p. 59].
The Coact Guard's law enforcement strategy consists
of supporting the National Drug Control Strategy and the
Department of Transportation's Strategies for Action ("to
make drugs undesirable and hard to obtain through a mix of
supply and demand policies"), and doing so by following the
agenda set by the service's Commandant. The agenda includes
maintaining a service-wide mission and resource flexibility
that places emphasis on coordinating the efforts of a
multitude of interdiction assets to respond to emergent
political, economic, and military situations.
2 ... and How is that Strateav Developed?
The Coast Guard law enforcement strategy develops in
a manner that closely follows the strategic planning process
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suggested by Bryson (Figure 1). This method includes four
steps which assist in distinguishing strategic issues.
First, the Coast Guard identifies organizational mandates
(the "musts" it confronts) by paying close attention to the
relevant legislation, agreements, and directives that affect
its law enforcement operations.
Second, the service clarifies its organizational
missions and values to provide its "reason for existence."
The Coast Guard does this by seeking to fill the nation's
identifiable social and p 1Itical needs. In this case, the
service answers the social and political demand for narcotics
interdiction as well as the demands for the other aspects of
its law enforcement mission.
Third, the Coast Guard assesses the external
environment by continually exploring for the opportunities
and threats to its law enforcement mission. This step
involves staying in tune to the forces, trends, competitors,
collaborators, and clients that make up the external
environment. This step emphasizes the significance of public
opinion, the Coast Guard's role in law enforcement, and the
expectations of individuals and organizations outside the
service.
In the fourth step toward identifying strategic law
enforcement issues, the Coast Guard assesses its internal
environment. The service analyzes its current strategy and
performance, which is often indicated by the parameters in
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its Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). The
Coast Guard's culture, its perceived law enforcement role,
and its law enforcement expectations significantly contribute
to the service's internal environment considerations.
The Coast Guard uses a direct approach to identify
its strategic law enforcement issues [Ref. 8:p. 57). The
first strategic issue which emerges from the previously-
mentioned four steps is that the Coast Guard first n.ust be
sensitive to the present and future needs of the public and
mandates from the Administration and Congress. Secondly, the
service must strive to maintain its multimission capability
and corresponding force structure.
The Coast Guard develops its law enforcement strategy
to address the issues highlighted by the previous steps in
the strategic planning process. The strategy considers
practical alternatives and directs the service toward a
vision of success. The vision of success is the Coast
Guard's description of what it should look like as it
successfully implements its strategies and reaches full
potential rRef. 8:p. 60]. The vision of success description
includes the Coast Guard's law enforcement mission, its basic
strategies, the Commandant's agenda and long-range view, its
performance standards (including PPBS criteria), and decision
rules and ethical norms.
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C. SECONDARY FINDINGS
While attempting to identify the Coast Guard's law
enforcement strategy and its development, several secondary
research questions arose. This section addresses those
subsidiary research questions.
1. What are the Weaknesses. Opportunities. Threats, and
Strenaths Underlyin Strategic Management of the USCG
Law Enforcement Mission?
The author provided a list of his findings from his
"WOTS UP" analysis of the Coast Guard law enforcement
mission. These weaknesses, opportunities, threats, and
strengths are summarized in Tables 8 through 11. Table 12
summarizes the key points of the WOTS UP analysis.
TABLE 12
USCG ELT MISSION WOTS UP SUMMARY
Strenaths Weaknesses
- USCG multimission - No formally stated
emphasis and capabilities strategy
- Mission-enthusiastic - Reactive, short term
personnel focus rather than long
- Public/Administration/ term, proactive
Congress approval of USCG emphasis
image - Strategy closely tied
to budget
0omortunities Threats
- Use increased funding from - Intra- and inter-agency
counternarcotics emphasis to resource competition
redevelop infrastructure - Congress oversight and
- Become more active in the fiscal process slow
international arena strategy development
- Use DoD resources to augment - Decreased funding as
anti-drug efforts anti-drug sentiment
weakens
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It is important to note that the WOTS UP analysis is
a method that assists the strategist to identify strategic
issues. It does so by focusing on the factors involved in
the organization's internal and external environments.
The WOTS characteristics noted in this study were
compiled from personal and telephone interviews of key Coast
Guard personnel at various levels and positions within the
organization. As a result, the perceptions of different
managers at different levels yield analyses that are subject
to debate and disagreement.
2. How is the Illegal Drug Enforcement Strategv Affected
by Increased National Interest in:
A. Halting the Flow of Narcotics into the U.S.
b. Diverting Resources from Supply Reduction Toward
Reducing Demand?
The Coast Guard law enforcement strategy seeks to
fulfill the designs of the National Drug Control Strategy.
One component of the national strategy is a supply reduction
policy that the Coast Guard actively supports. Supply
reduction, particularly interdiction and apprehension, is the
central focus of the policies, objectives, and action
sequences in the Coast Guard's law enforcement strategy.
The Department of State frequently tasks the Coast
Guard with providing personnel and training to foreign
government agencies in the narcotics producing nations. The
service possesses several characteristics which make it the
"service of choice" to conduct such a mission. Among these
features are the Coast Guard's non-DoD status, and its tested
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professionalism in both counternarcotics and riverine
operations.
Thus, the Coast Guard and national strategies include
the traditional supply reduction policies and actions of
detection, monitoring, interdiction, and apprehension. These
programs are now augmented with efforts by the producing
nations to control the supply from within their borders. The
new focus on international operations aims toward reducing
the output of the producing nations and, therefore, should
make a significant contribution toward the national supply
reduction policy.
The strategic issues that arise from these questions
can be identified by focusing on a "WOTS UP" analysis of the
law enforcement mission. The illegal drug enforcement
strategy must be flexible enough to account for augmenting
tactics that halt the narcotics flow into the U.S. with a
more proactive eradication program.
This illegal drug enforcement strategy must also
consider the forces and focus of the drug control program.
Currently, the national strategy emphasizes both supply and
demand reduction policies. There is no universally-accepted
measure of the effectiveness of either the supply or demand
reduction programs, thus national resources will continue to
be devoted to both efforts. In the long-range strategic
plan, the strategy will maintain its emphasis on both supply
and demand policies. The drug enforcement strategy must be
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capable of shifting its focus and resources toward that
policy which is more effective.
3. How is USCG Strategic Management in the Law
Enforcement Mission Affected by Increased Department
of Defense Involvement in Narcotics Interdiction?
Increasing the Department of Defense involvement in
narcotics interdiction will affect the Coast Guard's law
enforcement strategy in several ways. These factors are
highlighted in the USCG ELT mission WOTS UP summary (Tables 8
through 11). The increased DoD involvement adds more
variables to the issues which must be addressed by the Coast
Guard's strategy. The issues regarding expanded DoD
counternarcotics involvement are present in both the Coast
Guard's internal environment (law enforcement expectations,
the service's perceived role in law enforcement) and its
external environment (public opinion and DoD law enforcement
expectations).
4. What Effect does Increased Department of Defense
Involvement in Narcotics Interdiction Have on USCG
Tactics. Resources. and Force Structure?
The expanded DoD narcotics interdiction involvement
will significantly affect Coast Guard law enforcement goals,
policies and actions sequences in several manners. First,
Coast Guard tactics will shift to include using more DoD
resources for the detection and monitoring phases of
interdiction, while utilizing its own resources more during
the interdiction and apprehension phases.
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Second, the number of DoD resources ready and able to
augment the Coast Guard's counternarcotics forces eases the
demand placed upon the smaller service's resources. These
resources include funding, personnel, equipment, and
supplies. Third, the DoD and the Coast Guard can combine
their joint training requirements with their counternarcotics
efforts to incorporate multiple missions into single
operations. Thus, the counternarcotics force structure will
include both Coast Guard and DoD assets. The Coast Guard's
force structure will continue to reflect a multimission
capability which enables the service to shift its emphasis to
respond to public demand and the mandates of the Administra-
tion and Congress.
5. How does the USCG Budget Structure Reflect its Law
Enforcement Strategy?
As seen in Table 6, Coast Guard operating expenses
since 1984 reflect a renewed emphasis toward the service's
law enforcement mission. The budget reflects the need to
update an aging force structure with quality resources. The
question remains whether the state of the art equipment now
dedicated to the high technology counternarcotics effort is
needed or efficient should the service shift its future
emphasis to other missions. The Coast Guard's budget further
exhibits the service's commitment toward its ELT mission in
response to public opinion and in support of the National
Drug Control Strategy.
83
6. How does the Federal Budget Process (Deficit
Reduction. Congressional Oversight. etc.) Influence
USCG Law Enforcement Strategy?
As noted earlier, an organization's budget reflects
it strategy. In the WOTS UP analysis of the Coast Guard's
law enforcement mission, pecuniary considerations are present
in each of the four WOTS summaries. The federal budget
profoundly affects the Coast Guard's law enforcement strategy
--some even say that the service's strategy reflects its
budget, not vice versa.
The emphasis on deficit reduction will create
increased pressure for all federal agencies to establish that
their budget requests address national priorities. Increased
demands for funding placed upon decreased finances highlight
the intra- and inter-agency competition for budget dollars
that will result.
Congressional oversight tends to limit the managerial
freedom to form strategies. Pork barrel politics replaces
WOTS UP analysis in identifying strategic issues.
Legislative oversight also slows the budgetary process and
prevents agencies from being able to quickly respond to
changing opportunities and threats.
D. RECOMMENDATION
The most significant fact about the Coast Guard's long-
range law enforcement strategy is that it is not formally
stated. The author has used this study to analyze the
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service's law enforcement strategy from different
perspectives to personally determine whether such a strategy
statement is necessary.
In concluding, the author recommends that the Coast Guard
formally develops and issues a long-range strategy statement.
Such a document would serve to ensure that each of the
stakeholders involved in the Coast Guard law enforcement
mission is aware of the strategic issues and the goals,
policies, and action sequences that address those issues.
Thus, the pattern of decisions that joins Coast Guard law
enforcement objectives, policies, and action sequences will
be based on a document that provides a consistent and
justifiable basis for decision making.
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